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Chapter 11
Tax-Beneﬁt Reforms and Structural
Models for Labour Supply
Henk-Wim de Boer, Egbert Jongen, and Mauro Mastrogiacomo
11.1 Introduction
Faced with tight budget constraints, policymakers are reconsidering their tax-
beneﬁt policies and the trade-off between equity and efﬁciency (Mirrlees, 1971).
Redistribution from rich to poor households, or from singles to couples, distorts
the labour supply decision or effort more generally, and subgroups may respond
differently to this redistribution. Understanding the heterogeneity in labour market
responses of different groups, traditionallymeasured by the wage elasticity of labour
supply,1 is thus essential for an efﬁcient design of tax incentives.
1A related literature studies the elasticity of taxable income to measure the distortions of taxation
(Saez et al., 2012a). However, there is an active debate on whether the elasticity of taxable income
is a sufﬁcient statistics to measure the distortions from taxation (Chetty, 2009).
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In this chapter, we exploit a very large administrative dataset on Dutch house-
holds, the Arbeidsmarktpanel (Labour Market Panel) of Statistics Netherlands
(2012), to estimate the behavioural responses to changes in ﬁnancial incentives.
Speciﬁcally, the size of the dataset allows us to estimate the preferences and
corresponding labour supply elasticities for a large number of subgroups on the
Dutch labour market. In the estimations we use a discrete choice model for labour
supply (Aaberge et al., 1995; Van Soest, 1995; Keane and Mofﬁtt, 1998; Aaberge
et al., 1999; Brewer et al., 2006; Bargain et al., 2014).2 We subsequently use the
estimated preferences in a behavioural microsimulation model, and simulate the
labour supply effects of a large number of potential reforms that feature prominently
in the policy debate. We also simulate the effects of the reform package of the Tax
Plan 2016, which was discussed extensively in Dutch parliament.
To preview our results, we uncover large heterogeneity in the labour supply
elasticities of different demographic groups and decision margins. We ﬁnd that
childless singles and men in couples hardly respond to changes in ﬁnancial
incentives, whereas single parents and women in couples with young children are
quite responsive. We further ﬁnd that most of the response is in the number of
persons employed, not in the response in hours worked per week per employed,
and that cross-elasticities for women in couples are non-negligible. These ﬁndings
have the following implications for tax-beneﬁt reforms. Reductions in the marginal
tax rate, via e.g. a decrease in the tax bracket rates, hardly affect labour supply.
Reductions in income support for low-income households are relatively effective in
stimulating labour supply, but increase income inequality. However, higher in-work
beneﬁts for low-income workers are also relatively effective, and do not increase
income inequality. Furthermore, the most effective instruments are tax credits and
(child care) subsidies for single parents and secondary earners with young children.
These groups are the most responsive to changes in ﬁnancial incentives. The Tax
Plan 2016 stimulates labour supply in persons and in hours. Indeed, the Tax Plan
2016 contains a number of policy changes that are relatively effective in stimulating
labour supply, like the increase in the in-work tax credit for low-income workers,
the in-work tax credit for single parents and secondary earners with a young child
and an increase in child care subsidies.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 11.2 gives some context on the
Dutch labour market and gives a brief description of the Dutch tax-beneﬁt system
in 2015, which will serve as the baseline for our policy simulations. Section 11.3
describes the structural discrete-choice model and the empirical methodology.
Section 11.4 discusses the data used in the empirical analysis, and Sect. 11.5
2Discrete choice models have become popular in labour supply analysis because they greatly
simplify the analysis of (joint) labour supply decisions when there are kinks and non-convexities
in the budget set (due to e.g. the tax-beneﬁt system).
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presents the empirical results in terms of labour supply elasticities. Section 11.6
presents simulations results for a large number of tax-beneﬁt reforms, including
the reform package of the Tax Plan 2016. Section 11.7 discusses our ﬁndings and
concludes.
11.2 The Dutch Labour Market and Tax-Beneﬁt System
Over the past decades, the Netherlands has witnessed a number of relevant demo-
graphic changes.3 The share of couples with children has declined and the share of
couples without children has increased. Furthermore, the overall share of couples
has been declining, while the share of singles and single parents is now much
higher than a few decades ago. Hence, studying the behavioural responses by singles
and single parents has become more important over time. The participation rate of
women has increased spectacularly. In the mid 1970s, the participation rate of Dutch
women was one of the lowest in Europe, whereas by now it is one of the highest.
The participation rate of men was and remains high by international standards. This
has important implications for labour supply elasticities, as cross-country studies
(Bargain et al., 2014) and studies that look at labour supply elasticities over time
(Blau and Kahn, 2007) suggest that labour supply elasticities are much lower when
the participation rate is higher.4 In terms of hours worked per week, however, Dutch
women still work much less than their European counterparts (about 10 h per week
less on average), and so do Dutch men (about 5 h per week on average). So there
appears to be still a lot of potential on the intensive margin of labour supply. Below,
we consider whether this is the case.
Turning to the tax-beneﬁt system, like most OECD countries, the Netherlands has
a progressive income tax system.5 Labour income is taxed individually and marginal
income tax rates increase with income. Table 11.1 gives an overview of the most
relevant elements of the Dutch income tax system in 2015 for the current study. The
lowest marginal rate in 2015 is 36.5% payable over a taxable income of up to 19,822
euro. For incomes ranging from 19,822 to 57,585 euro, a marginal tax rate of 42%
applies. The highest marginal tax rate is 52%.
The tax system contains many tax credits, tax deductions and means-tested
beneﬁts, that make it rather complex.6 Tax credits reduce the total amount of income
tax people need to pay. Over the past decade, all instruments described in Table 11.1
3De Boer and Jongen (2017) give an overview of changes in the shares of the different household
types, and the changes in the participation rates and hours worked per week by household type.
4Indeed, as younger women more often participate in the labour market, their behaviour becomes
more similar to that of men within the same cohort. Our recent data show indeed much lower labour
supply elasticities for women, relative to those estimated in studies based on older data.
5For the overview of the tax-beneﬁt system we draw on CPB (2015).
6We exclude tax deductions from the analysis, since these could not be observed in our dataset.
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Table 11.1 The Dutch income tax system 2015
Income range Tax rate Maximum amount in euro
Income taxes 0–19,822 36:5% 7235
19,822–33,589 42:0% 13,017
33,589–57,585 42:0% 23,095
> 57,585 52:0%
General tax credit 0–19,822 2203
19,822–56,935 2203  2:32%  (taxable
income 19,822)
> 56,935 1342
EITC all workers 0–9010 1.8%  labour income
9010–19,463 163 C 19:7%  (labour
income 9010)
19,463–49,770 2220
49,770–100,670 2220  4:0%  (labour
income 49,770)
> 100,670 184
EITC working
parents
0–4857 0
4857–32,832 1033 + 4.0%  (labour
income 4857)
>32,832 2152
Childcare subsidy 90.7% costs ﬁrst child
93.3% costs subsequent children
Income dependent
child beneﬁt
Income < 19,463 1 child: 1032
2 children: 1823
3 children: 2006
Subsequent child(ren): 106 extra
Single parents bonus: 3050
Income > 19,463 Max. amount  6.75%  (taxable
income 19,463)
Rent subsidy Income < 21,950 Single-person household : 4079
Income < 29,800 Multi-person household: 3759
Health care beneﬁt 0–19,500 Singles: 936
0–19,500 Couples: 1788
Welfare beneﬁts Singles: 11,530
Couples: 16,471
Source: CPB (2015)
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have been subject to reform. The general tax credit (Algemene Hefﬁngskorting in
Dutch) is now income dependent. The maximum amount is 2203 euro in 2015, and
is phased out at 2.32% to a minimum of 1342 euro. All tax-paying individuals in
the Netherlands are entitled to the general tax credit. Then there are a number of
tax credits for workers. There is an earned income tax credit (EITC) for all workers
(Arbeidskorting in Dutch). Over the ﬁrst 9010 euro, the EITC increases with income,
with a phase-in rate of 1.8%. The subsequent phase-in rate is higher: 19.7% over
the income between 9010 and 19,463 euro (which is approximately the full-time
minimum wage in 2015). The maximum amount of the EITC for all workers is
2,220 euro. This amount remains constant for incomes between 19,463 and 49,770
euro. The general EITC is phased out for higher incomes, at a rate of 4%, until the
minimum amount of 184 euro is reached. For secondary earners and single parents
with a youngest child up to 12 years of age there is a speciﬁc income-dependent
EITC (Inkomensafhankelijke Combinatiekorting in Dutch). Working single parents
and secondary earners receive a base amount of 1033 euro if their personal labour
income exceeds the minimum income level of 4857 euro. This targeted EITC rises
with income, with a phase-in rate of 4% up to a maximum of 2152 euro.
Next to tax credits, working parents with young children also qualify for child-
care subsidies, which are also income-dependent. The subsidy makes a distinction
between the ﬁrst child and any subsequent children.7 The maximum subsidy rate
in 2015 is 90.7% for the ﬁrst child, and the minimum subsidy rate is 18%. The
parental contribution rate increases with income. The maximum subsidy rate for a
second child is higher, 93.3%, and the phase-out of the subsidy is less steep than for
the ﬁrst child. The minimum subsidy rate for the second child is 58.2%.
The tax-beneﬁt system also contains several income-dependent beneﬁts that
provide income support to low-income households bearing certain costs. These
beneﬁts depend negatively on the level of taxable household income, increasing
effective marginal (and participation) tax rates (CPB, 2015). Parents can apply for
income-dependent child beneﬁts (Kindgebonden Budget in Dutch) for the costs
related to their children up to 18 years of age. Households receive an annual amount
per child. Households with one child receive a maximum amount of 1032 euro,
and households with two children receive a maximum amount of 1823 euro. Single
parents receive an additional amount of 3050 euro. This beneﬁt is phased out at a rate
of 6.75%. Next, the rent subsidy is an income-dependent beneﬁt that compensates
low-income households for rent costs. It depends on household income, household
composition and the rent level. The maximum amount in 2015 is 4079 euro for
single-person households and 3759 for multi-person households. Finally, the health
care beneﬁt is an income-dependent beneﬁt for health care costs. In the Netherlands,
standard healthcare insurance is compulsory: adults pay an insurance premium, and
their children under the age of 18 are included in the insurance policy for free. The
beneﬁt level depends on household income but is independent of actual health care
7The ﬁrst child is the child with the highest number of hours formal childcare.
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expenditures. In 2015, the maximum health care beneﬁt is 936 euro for singles and
1788 euro for couples. This beneﬁt is phased out at a rate of 13.4%. Higher income
households are not entitled to health care beneﬁts.
Finally, Table 11.1 also gives the level of welfare beneﬁts, distinguishing
between singles and couples. Welfare beneﬁts are minimum beneﬁt payments, at
the household level, for households without other means of income to guarantee a
minimum standard of living. The welfare beneﬁt is higher for couples (16,471 euro)
than for singles (11,530 euro).
11.3 Structural Model
We use structural models to estimate the labour supply elasticities of different
groups on the Dutch labour market. Households are assumed to maximize a unitary
utility function subject to a budget constraint and a time constraint. We use a ﬂexible
speciﬁcation for preferences: a translog utility function, also used in e.g. Van Soest
(1995). The choice of hours of work is the result of a coordinated decision of the
two adult household members m and f . Deﬁne y as household income and hm and hf
as the number of hours worked by the respective partners. We also explicitly model
the use of formal childcare for households with young children, where c denotes
the number of childcare hours per week. The most elaborate speciﬁcation is then as
follows:
Ud./ D 0A C b0 C d01Œ > 0;
 D .log. y/; log.1  hm=T/; log.1  hf=T/; log.c//;
 D .hm; hf ; c/; (11.1)
where we use the weekly time endowment T to transform the number of working
hours into leisure.8 The vector v consists of the logarithms of disposable household
income (y), leisure of the man .1  hm=T/, leisure of the woman .1  hf=T/ and
hours of formal childcare (c). The matrix A is the symmetric matrix of quadratic
coefﬁcients, and the vector b contains the coefﬁcients corresponding to vector v.
The vector d captures ﬁxed costs of work for men and women. These are ﬁxed
costs related to working, which are expected to be negative terms for options where
the respective person is working. As shown by e.g. Van Soest (1995), ﬁxed costs
are necessary to reproduce the low share of individuals that work only few hours
per week. Of course, there are sound economic arguments to include them. Fixed
costs of work represent disutility from work such as travelling costs, search costs
or market frictions. They also play a crucial role in the distinction between the
8We use total number of hours per week, e.g. 168, as the weekly time endowment. Different values
for T hardly affected the results.
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extensive (participation) and intensive (hours per week) response to changes in
ﬁnancial incentives. We do not include them in income or leisure, but simply include
a dummy in utility metric, as in Van Soest (1995). Similarly, we also include ﬁxed
costs of using formal childcare.
We allow for preference variation through observed individual and household
characteristics x2, x3 and x4 in parameters b2, b3 and b4:
b2 D x02ˇ2; b3 D x03ˇ3; b4 D x04ˇ4; (11.2)
which are the linear utility terms in leisure of the male, leisure of the female, and
hours of formal child care, respectively. The same variation is also allowed for the
ﬁxed costs parameters d.
Next to the deterministic part of household utility Ud./ deﬁned above, utility
also contains an individual and option speciﬁc random utility term "j, necessary to
reproduce heterogeneous choices for otherwise similar individuals as observed in
the data:
U.j/ D Ud.j/ C "j: (11.3)
"j is assumed to be identically and independently distributed across individuals
and options, according to an Extreme Value Type-I distribution: This results in
a convenient multinomial logit speciﬁcation for the probabilities for observing
individuals in particular options (McFadden, 1978).
Households choose their preferred combination of hours of work and childcare
from a ﬁnite set of alternatives j 2 f1; : : : ; Jg. We experimented with a number of
discretizations, an interval of 8 h (a normal working day in the Netherlands) running
from 0 to 40 h gave a good ﬁt to the data and worked well in the estimations. For
singles without young children, we then have 6 discrete options, and for couples
without young children we have 66 D 36 discrete options. The discrete choice set
becomes larger for households who potentially use formal childcare. Speciﬁcally,
we have 64 D 24 alternatives for lone parents with young children, and 664 D
144 alternatives for couples with a young children.
Disposable income in each discrete option is calculated as:
y D wmhm C wf hf  T.wm; hm;wf ; hf I q/  TC. pc; cI q/ C S. pc; c; ytI q/; (11.4)
where wm and wf represent the gross hourly wage for the man and the woman. For
households with young children, who potentially use childcare, we also take the
costs of childcare TC.:/ and the childcare subsidy S into account. Here, the vector
q denotes individual and household characteristics, TC.:/ is the total cost of formal
childcare, with pc denoting the price per hour of formal childcare, and S.:/ is the
childcare subsidy, which depends on the hourly price of formal childcare, hours of
formal childcare, taxable income yt and the age distribution of the children.
For all household types we also estimated models where we allow for the
possibility that families which are observationally equivalent might have different
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tastes for work and formal childcare, using the so-called latent classes approach
(Train, 2008). We assume that there is a ﬁnite number K of latent household classes
(or types), with households having homogeneous preferences within each class but
heterogeneous preferences across classes. In practice, this means that we estimate a
ﬁnite mixture model with K parametrizations of the utility function, corresponding
to K distinct subsets of our data. All the preference parameters therefore become
class-speciﬁc, which is equivalent to the assumption that they are drawn from a
mass-point distribution (Heckman and Singer, 1984). The full set of parameters to
be estimated is then:
 D .1; : : : ; K/ D .A1;b1;d1; : : : ;AK ;bK ;dK/: (11.5)
Since the classes are by deﬁnition unobservable, we cannot determine whether a
given household belongs to a speciﬁc class or not. Instead, we have to construct
household-level probabilities of class membership Pi.class D k/, which reﬂect how
likely it is that household i has the preferences corresponding to class k, conditional
on the household’s choices and other observable characteristics. These probabilities
are then used as individual weights for a set of class-speciﬁc multinomial logit
models with separate parameter vectors  k.
The resulting log-likelihood function of the ﬁnite mixture model has the follow-
ing form:
L D
IX
iD1
1
R

RX
rD1
log
0
BBB@
KX
kD1
Pi.class D k/ 
JX
jD1
0
BBB@
exp

Usij.r;  k/

JP
j0D1
exp

Usij0.r; k/
  Dij
1
CCCA
1
CCCA : (11.6)
For workers we use observed gross wages, while for non-workers we simulate gross
wages by using a Heckman selection model. Similarly, we use observed hourly
prices for users of formal childcare and we simulate these prices for non-users
of childcare. Jongen et al. (2014) provide a detailed description of the empirical
speciﬁcation and the estimation results for the Heckman selection models for gross
hourly wages and prices of childcare. We account for wage heterogeneity and price
heterogeneity by taking R draws from the estimated wage and price distribution.9
Consequently, there is no analytical solution for the likelihood function and we
need to integrate over these distributions. The approach we follow is to maximize
a simulated likelihood. We draw R wages, compute the likelihood, and average it
out over the R draws. Dij is an indicator function which takes the value 1 for the
observed choice, and zero otherwise.
For part of the household types the latent classes models work well, in particular
for couples with a youngest child 0–3 and 4–11 years of age. However, for some
household types the latent classes models produce implausible results, in particular
9The number of draws in our speciﬁcation with latent classes is 10, and it is kept relatively low to
limit the computational complexity of the model.
jakob.de.haan@rug.nl
11 Tax-Beneﬁt Reforms and Structural Models for Labour Supply 247
for single parents, with a large share having negative marginal utility of income in
the observed choices. For the other household types, the labour supply responses
using the latent class models are very similar to the ‘homogeneous’ model (with
only 1 class). Based on these results we decided to use the latent classes models
for couples with a youngest child which is 0–3 or 4–11 years of age, and the
homogeneous speciﬁcation for all other groups.
11.4 Data
To estimate the preferences of the different household types we use the Labour
Market Panel (in Dutch: Arbeidsmarktpanel) of Statistics Netherlands (2012).
The backbone of the Labour Market Panel are the annual observations of the
Labour Force Survey (in Dutch: Enquete Beroepsbevolking) for the period 1999–
2009, which contains the education level of adult members of the household.
Statistics Netherlands supplements this data set with three additional data sources.
First, administrative data from municipalities for the period 1999–2009 (in Dutch:
Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie) that contains information on individual and
household characteristics like age, ethnicity, ages of the children and area of
residence. Second, administrative data from the Social Statistical Panel for the
period 1999–2009 (in Dutch: Sociaal Statistisch Bestand) on hours worked and
gross income. Third, administrative data on formal childcare from the Formal
Childcare Database of the Tax Ofﬁce for the period 2006–2009 (in Dutch: Wet
Kinderopvangtoeslag). With respect to formal childcare, a distinction is made
between daycare (children 0–3 years of age) and out-of-school care (children 4–
11 years of age).
We estimate a structural model for the simultaneous choice of labour supply
and, if applicable, the use of formal childcare.10 Because data on childcare in our
data set is available from 2006 onwards, we restrict the sample to the period 2006–
2009. Furthermore, formal childcare subsidies are available to parents up to the point
where the child goes to secondary school. Therefore, we only allow households with
a youngest child of 0–11 years of age to choose formal childcare. Before the age of
4, children can go to daycare, whereas older children can go to out-of-school care.
For households without children, or with a youngest child of 12 years of age or
older, the childcare terms in the utility function drop out. We exclude households
with missing information on individual or household characteristics. Furthermore,
to limit the computational burden, we take a 15% sample of the full data set for
couples and for childless singles. For single parents we use the full sample.
10Unfortunately, informal childcare is not in our administrative dataset. However, De Boer et al.
(2015) show that including informal childcare, calculated as the overlap in working hours of
parents minus the hours of formal childcare, does not affect the results.
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Individuals who adjust their labour supply in our model are employed, on
welfare beneﬁts or without any income resources. We do not model and effectively
ignore the labour supply of the following types of individuals: students and retired,
disabled or self-employed persons. Below we will refer to these individuals as
having ‘inﬂexible’ labour supply. We do not include these individuals because we
do not have reliable information on their hours worked, or because we are unable
to determine their budget constraint. We also drop individuals with unemployment
beneﬁts, implicitly assuming that they are constrained in their labour supply choice.
Furthermore, we also drop same sex households. Finally, we drop individuals under
18 years of age, and individuals over 63 years of age.
For the empirical analysis, we distinguish between ‘1-ﬂex households’ and ‘2-
ﬂex households’. Couples are ‘2-ﬂex households’ when both partners are able
to adjust their labour supply, and ‘1-ﬂex households’ if only one partner has a
ﬂexible labour supply. However, we account for the ‘inﬂexible’ partner income
when calculating the budget constraint of the ‘ﬂexible’ partner. In the estimations we
distinguish 15 household types: childless singles (1), single parents with a youngest
child aged 0–3, 4–11, 12–17 or 18 years of age or older (2–5), adult children living
with their parent(s) (6), couples without children with both partner ﬂexible (7),
couples without children where only the man is able to adjust his labour supply
(8), couples without children where only the woman is able to adjust her labour
supply (9), couples where both partners are ﬂexible and with a youngest child aged
0–3, 4–11, 12–17 or 18 years of age or older (10–13), couples with children where
only the man can adjust his labour supply (14), and couples with children where
only the woman can adjust her labour supply (15).
We use the tax-beneﬁt model MIMOSI (Koot et al., 2016) to calculate disposable
income for each of the alternatives. MIMOSI is an advanced tax-beneﬁt calculator
employed by CPB to determine the redistributional and budgetary effects of reform
proposals for the tax-beneﬁt system. MIMOSI calculates the budget constraints
very accurately, taking into account taxes, premiums and a large number of group-
speciﬁc, income-independent and income-dependent subsidies and tax credits.
Disposable income is deﬁned as gross income after taxes, employees’ premiums,
the nominal health care fee, expenditures on formal childcare and inclusive of
childcare subsidies. Disposable income in the utility function, in the estimations
and simulations, is in 2006 prices.
11.5 Empirical Results
In this section we present the labour supply elasticities for all the subgroups.
The estimated preferences, ﬁt of the hours distribution and annual gross wage
distributions can be found in Jongen et al. (2014). Discrete choice models do not
have an analytical solution for the labour supply elasticity. This has to be simulated.
We simulate these elasticities by increasing gross hourly wages by 10%. We present
the total elasticity (the percentage change in total hours worked over the percentage
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change in the gross wage rate), and the decomposition of this total elasticity into the
extensive margin elasticity (the percentage change in the participation rate over the
percentage change in the gross wage rate) and the intensive margin (the percentage
change in hours worked by the employed over the percentage change in the gross
wage rate).
Figure 11.1 gives the simulated labour supply elasticities for couples in which
both partners can choose whether or not to work and for how many days per week.
We estimate this for several subgroups, where subgroups are deﬁned by the age
of the youngest child, including a category for ﬂexible couples without children.
We ﬁnd small, positive labour suppy elasticities for men, see panel (a). The labour
supply elasticities are much higher for women, both on the extensive margin and
on the intensive margin, see panel (b). Furthermore, the labour supply elasticities
for women in couples are particularly high when the youngest child is 0–3 years of
age (pre primary school age) or 4–11 years of age (primary school age). Figure 11.2
gives the so-called cross elasticities for these couples, i.e. the percentage change in
total hours worked by one partner over the percentage change in the gross wage rate
of the other partner. Panel (a) shows that cross elasticities are negative but close to
zero for men. For women however, the cross elasticities are non-negligible.
(a)
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Fig. 11.1 Households with two ﬂexible persons. (a) Men. (b) Women
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Fig. 11.2 Cross elasticities in households with two ﬂexible persons. (a) Men. (b) Women
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Fig. 11.3 Households with one ﬂexible person, and adult children. (a) Singles and single parents.
(b) Individuals with an inﬂexible partner, and adult children living at home
Figure 11.3 panel (a) shows that the labour supply elasticity is relatively low
for singles without children. The labour supply elasticity is much higher for single
parents with young children. The labour supply elasticity of single parents whose
youngest child is no longer in primary school is much lower, though still higher
than for singles without children. Also note that the differences across single parents
are primarily driven by differences in the extensive margin elasticity. The intensive
margin response for single parents is quite small.11
Figure 11.3 panel (b) gives the labour supply elasticities for men and women in
couples where one of the partners labour supply is inﬂexible (because this person is
e.g. disabled or retired). For these groups we pool couples with children of all ages.
Most men with an inﬂexible partner work, and typically also fulltime (see Jongen
et al., 2014). Hence, there is little upward potential in terms of total hours worked,
and they have a relatively low labour supply elasticity. Women have more upward
potential in total hours worked, both in terms of the participation rate and in terms
of hours worked per employed. Women with an inﬂexible partner have a higher
labour supply elasticity, in particular on the extensive margin. Panel (b) also gives
the labour supply elasticity for adult children living at the home of their parents.
They have a very high participation rate (when they are not disabled, etc.), resulting
in a very low labour supply elasticity.
A more detailed discussion on the empirical results can be found in Jongen et al.
(2014). Here, we also present a comparison of predictions by the structural model
with the ﬁndings from three recent quasi-experimental studies. More speciﬁcally, we
use the estimated structural model to simulate a number of key reforms implemented
in the past and compare the simulated treatment effects with quasi-experimental
studies on the same reforms. In particular, we compare the simulated treatment
effects of the 2005–2009 reform of childcare subsidies and in-work beneﬁts for
11Their budget constraint plays an important role here, where working only a few days per week
often does not generate net income higher than net income out of work.
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households with young children with the estimated treatment effects presented in
Bettendorf et al. (2015). Furthermore, we compare the simulated treatment effects
of the 2002 reform of the in-work beneﬁt for single parents with the estimated
treatment effects presented in Bettendorf et al. (2014). Finally, we compare the
simulated intensive margin (hours worked per employed person) elasticities of the
structural model with the estimated intensive margin elasticities presented in Bosch
and van der Klaauw (2012) and Bosch and Jongen (2013), who use the 2001 tax
reform that substantially reduced marginal tax rates. We ﬁnd that the simulated
treatment effects of these past reforms in the structural model are in line with the
estimated treatment effects in the quasi-experimental studies.
11.6 Policy Simulations
Next, we use the estimated structural models to simulate counterfactual policy
reforms, using the 2015 tax-beneﬁt system as the base. We present results for: (1)
changes in the tax bracket rates, (2) changes in targeted income support for low-
income households, (3) changes in policies targeted at the extensive margin, (4)
changes in policies targeted at working parents with young children and (5) the
reform package of the Tax Plan 2016.
11.6.1 Changes in Tax Bracket Rates
Table 11.2 gives the simulation results for changes in the tax bracket rates, and the
group averages in the base for comparison.12 Speciﬁcally, we consider the effects
of decreasing income tax rate in the ﬁrst, second, third and fourth (open) income
tax bracket so that tax receipts decrease by 1.5 billion euro.13 To keep the table to a
manageable size, we report aggregate results for the following groups:
• ‘Men in couples young. child 0–17’ and ‘Women in couples young. child 0–17’
are respectively men and women in couples with a youngest child 0–17 years of
age, and both partners can choose all hours options.
• ‘Men in other couples’ and ‘Women in other couples’ are respectively men and
women in couples without children, in couples with a youngest child 18 years of
age or older, and in couples with a partner whose labour supply is ‘ﬁxed’.
12The results are for individuals whose labour supply is determined within the model only, so
excluding the ‘ﬁxed’ labour supply by partners in couples that are e.g. disabled, self-employed,
etc.
13Due to the smaller tax base in the higher brackets than the lower brackets, the percentage point
decrease in the tax rate in the higher brackets is larger than in the lower brackets. Speciﬁcally, the
decrease in the tax rate is respectively: 0.8, 2.1, 3.4 and 5.2 percentage points.
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Table 11.2 Changes in tax bracket rates
.1/ .2/ .3/ .4/
First Second Third Fourth
Simulation Base bracket bracket bracket bracket
Change in bracket rate 0:8 2:1 3:4 5:2
Ex ante impulse (in billion) 1:5 1:5 1:5 1:5
Percentage changes
Gini coefﬁcienta 0:22 0:30 0:87 1:33
Hours worked per week 27:5 0:02 0:09 0:07 0:02
– Men in couples young. child 0–17 35:2 0:09 0:04 0:10 0:07
– Women in couples young. child 0–17 17:8 0:12 0:17 0:03 0:10
– Men in other couples 34:6 0:03 0:06 0:11 0:05
– Women in other couples 20:5 0:01 0:06 0:01 0:02
– Single parents young. child 0–17 20:8 0:06 0:24 0:17 0:05
– Singles 30:3 0:01 0:10 0:07 0:01
Participation rate 0:82 0:00 0:04 0:00 0:02
– Men in couples young. child 0–17 0:93 0:05 0:05 0:03 0:02
– Women in couples young. child 0–17 0:77 0:11 0:02 0:16 0:12
– Men in other couples 0:91 0:02 0:05 0:07 0:03
– Women in other couples 0:71 0:02 0:01 0:04 0:04
– Single parents young. child 0–17 0:68 0:04 0:16 0:07 0:01
– Singles 0:85 0:02 0:05 0:03 0:01
Effective labour units per hour 0:01 0:02 0:03 0:03
aGini coefﬁcient of disposable household income, using equivalence scales. The Gini coefﬁcient
is calculated over the full Dutch adult population with gross income above 66% of the annual
minimum wage
• ‘Single parents youngest child 0–17’ are single parents with a youngest 0–17
years of age.
• ‘Singles’ consists of singles without children, single parents with a youngest
child 18 years of age or older, and adult children living with their parents.
For these groups we report the effects on hours worked per week and on the
participation rate. We also report the effect on average ‘effective labour units per
hour’, which is calculated as the change in labour costs minus the change in hours
worked. The latter captures a composition effect on labour productivity. When
workers with low labour costs work less hours and workers with high labour costs
work more hours, effective labour units per hour will increase.
Column (1) gives the results for the decrease in the tax rate in the ﬁrst bracket.
Overall, we ﬁnd hardly any effect of changing the tax rate in the ﬁrst bracket on
hours worked, the participation rate and effective labour units per hour. However,
this is the net result of some groups that decrease their labour supply, and some
that increase their labour supply. For men in couples, the ﬁrst bracket is typically
inframarginal (not the relevant marginal tax rate), and changing the ﬁrst bracket
rate only generates an income effect. They reduce their labour supply. Women in
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couples with dependent children raise their labour supply. They typically have lower
income and lowering the tax rate in the ﬁrst tax bracket has both an income and a
substitution effect. The substitution effect dominates and they increase their labour
supply. For women in other couples and singles, the effect on labour supply is close
to zero. Single parents show a negative response to the increase in the tax rate in
the ﬁrst tax bracket. A lower ﬁrst bracket rate increases welfare beneﬁts and as a
result single parents reduce their labour supply. Income inequality, as measured by
the Gini-coefﬁcient, falls.
Column (2) gives the effect of lowering the tax rate in the second bracket. The
effect on overall labour supply in hours is positive, but the effect on labour supply in
persons is close to zero, and the effect on effective labour units per hour is slightly
negative. For many workers, the second tax bracket is the relevant marginal rate, and
their substitution effect dominates their income effect. The same is true for singles.
The effect on hours worked by single parents is now also positive, as the lower
second tax bracket rate does not increase welfare beneﬁts. Note that the participation
rate of women in couples with a child 0–17 years of age decreases. Here the cross
effect of higher income for males in these couples plays an important role. This
‘income effect’ stimulates some women in these couples to leave the labour market,
an ‘added worker effect’ (Lundberg, 1985). Income inequality rises somewhat in
this simulation.
Column (3) gives the effects of the decrease in the third tax bracket rate. The
increase in overall labour supply in hours is somewhat smaller than in column
(2), because the labour supply of women in couples with children falls. Indeed,
although for part of these women the third tax bracket is the relevant marginal tax
bracket, their own income effect and the income effect from higher income of the
male dominates. However, in contrast to column (2), effective labour units per hour
increases somewhat. More productiveworkers increase their hours worked, whereas
less productive workers reduce their hours worked.
Finally, column (4) gives the effects of the decrease in the fourth tax bracket.
Lowering the fourth tax bracket has only a small positive effect on overall hours
worked and the effect on labour supply in persons is even negative (due to the added
worker effect). However, effective labour units per hour again increases under in
this simulation, due to the composition effect. This simulation generates the largest
increase in income inequality.
Overall, changes in marginal tax rates generate rather small effects on the
participation rate and hours worked. Indeed, marginal tax rates affect mostly the
intensive margin, which is rather unresponsive, and cross-effects in couples also
limit the overall effect. Chapter 4 by in ‘t Veld et al. presents larger labour supply
responses from changes in general taxation. However in Chapter 4 the overall
labour supply elasticity is calibrated to be 0.3–0.4. This elasticity is relatively high
compared to our estimates, especially for men, and ignores the presence of cross-
effects in couples. We should note though that we only model changes in labour
participation and hours worked. We do not model changes in e.g. human capital
accumulation and retirement. Accounting for these additional changes may result in
a larger overall response of effective labour supply to tax changes.
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11.6.2 Changes in Income Support for Low-Income
Households
More pronounced are the effects of changes in income support targeted at low-
income households. Indeed, these policies implicitly target the more responsive
extensive margin, because they provide more subsidies to households where one
or more individuals do not work. Table 11.3 gives the simulation results of three
cuts in income support for low-income households.
Column (1) gives the effects of a decrease in the subsidy for low-income
households with young children (Kindgebonden Budget in Dutch), of 500 million
euro in total.14 This causes a relatively large increase in labour supply in hours and
in persons. In this reform, the income effect and the substitution effect work in the
same direction. Furthermore, this stimulates secondary earners and single parents to
work (more), which is a relatively elastic group.15 However, this reform also reduces
effective labour units per hour somewhat, and leads to a substantial rise in income
inequality.16
In column (2) we simulate a reduction in the rent subsidy for low-income
households (Huurtoeslag in Dutch), again for a total amount of 500 million euro.17
This also has a relatively strong effect on labour participation, in persons and in
hours. However, the effect is less pronounced than in column (1) because it does not
solely target the elastic group of households with young children.
Finally, column (3) gives the results for a reduction in the health care subsidy
for low-income households (Zorgtoeslag in Dutch), again for a total amount of 500
million euro.18 This reform also stimulates labour participation, but the effect is less
pronounced than in columns (1) and (2). The health care subsidy is phased out rather
gradually, and as a result beneﬁts a large part of the income distribution. Because
this subsidy is less targeted at the lowest incomes, reducing it has a more moderate
effect on labour supply.
11.6.3 Changes in Policies Targeted at the Extensive Margin
Next, we consider policy reforms that explicitly target the extensive margin: changes
in welfare beneﬁts and changes in the general in-work tax credit (Arbeidskorting in
Dutch).
14We decrease the maximum amount for all families by 45%, and keep the phase out rate ﬁxed at
6.75%.
15Note that there is also a small effect on men and women in other couples, these are the men and
women in couples with a partner whose labour supply is ﬁxed, but have a dependent child.
16Note that the budgetary impulse in this simulation is only a third of the tax bracket simulations.
17We reduce the rent beneﬁt by 18%, but keep the phase-out range the same.
18We decrease the maximum amount of the beneﬁt by 14%, and keep the phase out rate at 13.4%.
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Table 11.3 Changes in income support for low-income households
.1/ .2/ .3/
Income-dependent Income-dependent Income-dependent
Simulation child subsidya rent subsidyb health care subsidyc
Ex ante impulse (in billion euro) 0:5 0:5 0:5
Percentage changes
Gini coefﬁcientd 0:44 0:67 0:46
Hours worked per week 0:25 0:17 0:12
– Men in couples young.
child 0–17
0:48 0:20 0:14
– Women in couples young.
child 0–17
0:86 0:15 0:19
– Men in other couples 0:04 0:07 0:10
– Women in other couples 0:17 0:08 0:16
– Single parents young.
child 0–17
0:76 0:72 0:20
– Singles 0:00 0:22 0:08
Participation rate 0:22 0:15 0:11
– Men in couples young.
child 0–17
0:42 0:19 0:13
– Women in couples young.
child 0–17
0:63 0:14 0:16
– Men in other couples 0:04 0:06 0:09
– Women in other couples 0:14 0:07 0:14
– Single parents young.
child 0–17
0:59 0:53 0:14
– Singles 0:00 0:18 0:05
Effective labour units per hour 0:04 0:04 0:02
aA decrease in the income dependent child beneﬁt (Kindgebonden Budget), an income dependent
subsidy for parents with a youngest child up to 18 years of age. The subsidy is phased-out from
19,463 euro at a rate of 6.75%. We decrease the subsidy by 45%, and keep the phase-out rate the
same. Hence, we extend the phase-out range of the subsidy
bA decrease in the income dependent rent subsidy (Huurtoeslag), an income dependent subsidy that
compensates lower income households for rent costs. It depends on household income, household
composition and the rent level. The maximum amount in 2015 is 4079 euro for single-person
households and 3759 euro for multi-person households. We lower the rent beneﬁt by 18% but keep
the phase-out range the same
cA decrease in the income dependent health care subsidy (Zorgtoeslag), an income dependent
subsidy that compensates lower income households for the compulsory health care insurance. In
2015, the maximum health care beneﬁt is 936 euro for singles and 1788 euro for couples. This
beneﬁt is phased out from 19,463 euro at a rate of 13.4% in 2015. We lower the health care beneﬁt
by 14% but keep the phase-out range the same
dGini coefﬁcient of disposable household income, using equivalence scales. The Gini coefﬁcient
is calculated over the full Dutch adult population with gross income above 66% of the annual
minimum wage
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Table 11.4 Changes in policies targeted at the extensive margin
.1/ .2/ .3/
Welfare In-work tax credit, In-work tax credit,
Simulation beneﬁtsa across-the-boardb targeted at low incomesc
Ex ante impulse (in billion euro) 0:5 1:5 1:5
Percentage changes
Gini coefﬁcientd 0:78 0:10 0:35
Hours worked per week 0:66 0:13 0:17
– Men in couples young.
child 0–17
0:67 0:03 0:04
– Women in couples young.
child 0–17
0:54 0:33 0:61
– Men in other couples 0:47 0:10 0:02
– Women in other couples 0:62 0:15 0:23
– Single parents young.
child 0–17
2:54 0:33 0:53
– Singles 0:67 0:14 0:20
Participation rate 0:62 0:13 0:22
– Men in couples young.
child 0–17
0:67 0:09 0:13
– Women in couples young.
child 0–17
0:49 0:20 0:50
– Men in other couples 0:43 0:11 0:07
– Women in other couples 0:57 0:14 0:27
– Single parents young.
child 0–17
2:38 0:32 0:60
– Singles 0:60 0:09 0:15
Effective labour units per hour 0:12 0:05 0:10
aReduction in welfare beneﬁts by 14%
bAn increase in the (maximum) general in-work tax credit (Arbeidskorting) of 245 euro, by
increasing the phase-in rate from 19.7 to 22.0%
cAn increase in the (maximum) general in-work tax credit (Arbeidskorting) of 441 euro, by
increasing the phase-in rate from 19.7 to 23.9%. The higher in-work tax credit is phased out from
34,000 euro onwards at 4%. The phase-out rate is the same as in the current system, but the new
phase-out starts at an income of 34,000 euro instead of 49,770 euro in the current system. The level
of the general in-work tax credit for incomes above 49,770 euro remains the same as in the current
system
dGini coefﬁcient of disposable household income, using equivalence scales. The Gini coefﬁcient
is calculated over the full Dutch adult population with gross income above 66% of the annual
minimum wage
In the ﬁrst simulation, column (1) of Table 11.4, we lower welfare beneﬁts by
14% for a total amount of 500 million euro. This leads to a substantial increase
in overall labour supply in hours and persons. The response is particularly large
for single parents, 32% of single parents are on welfare beneﬁts in the base, and
they are also particularly responsive to ﬁnancial incentives. The effect on effective
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labour units per hour is negative, as the productivity of the additional workers is
below average. Also, lowering welfare beneﬁts leads to a substantial rise in income
inequality.
In the second and third simulation we use the ‘carrot’ rather than the ‘stick’,
and increase the general in-work tax credit, for all workers, for a total amount of
1.5 billion euro.19 In column (2), we increase the maximum level of the tax credit
by 245 euro, such that the maximum tax credit (2465 euro) is reached at the same
income of 19,463 euro. The effects are much smaller than in the ﬁrst simulation,
despite the larger budgetary impulse, because the share of employed individuals
is much larger than the share of individuals on welfare beneﬁts. This makes the
increase in disposable income per working person much smaller than the reduction
in disposable income of non-working individuals in the welfare beneﬁts simulation
(in absolute terms). Also, this reform is less targeted at the responsive group of
single parents. Still, labour supply in hours and persons increases for all groups, and
the effects are larger than for the reductions in the tax bracket rates. There is some
decrease in effective labour units per hour and a slight increase in income inequality.
In column (3) we target the in-work tax credit more strongly at low income
individuals by raising the maximum tax credit even further (to 2661 euro). In order
to keep the budgetary impulse identical to the second scenario, we lower the start
of the phase out of the tax credit to an income of 34,000 euro. This leads to a larger
effect on total hours worked because the tax credit is more targeted at the extensive
margin. The higher tax credit now increases labour supply more for women in
couples, singles and single parents, than in the second simulation. By contrast, men
in couples with dependent children slightly lower their labour supply. Some men,
with a high income, now receive a lower tax credit due to the earlier phase out of
the tax credit. Effective labour units per hour decreases more in column (3) than in
column (2). However, reform (3) decreases rather than increases income inequality.
11.6.4 Changes in Policies Targeted at Working Parents
with Children
Table 11.5 gives the results for policies targeted at working parents with children.
This group is of particular interest because there are many policies targeted
speciﬁcally at this group, and because mothers with young children appear to be
particularly responsive to changes in ﬁnancial incentives. We consider simulations
with a budgetary impulse of 500 million euro, because these policies target only
a subgroup of the working age population (and therefore the budgetary base is
relatively small).
19In 2015, the general in-work tax credit rises up to an income of 19,463 euro (close to the
minimum wage), where the maximum credit is 2220 euro. The tax credit is phased-out with 4%,
over an income of 49,770 euro and 100,670 euro.
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Table 11.5 Changes in policies for working parents with children
.1/ .2/ .3/ .4/
Income
Additional dependent
credita combination combination Childcare
Simulation credita creditb creditc subsidiesd
Ex ante impulse (in billion euro) 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5
Percentage changes
Gini coefﬁciente 0:11 0:10 0:01 0:01
Hours worked per week 0:05 0:11 0:18 0:11
– Men in couples young. child 0–17 0:03 0:02 0:02 0:04
– Women in couples young. child 0–17 0:25 0:72 1:25 0:92
– Men in other couples 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00
– Women in other couples 0:03 0:05 0:06 0:00
– Single parents young. child 0–17 0:39 0:76 1:10 0:12
– Singles 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Participation rate 0:10 0:19 0:16 0:08
– Men in couples young. child 0–17 0:09 0:10 0:10 0:05
– Women in couples young. child 0–17 0:39 0:91 0:66 0:47
– Men in other couples 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00
– Women in other couples 0:04 0:07 0:06 0:00
– Single parents young. child 0–17 0:40 0:77 0:99 0:10
– Singles 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Effective labour units per hour 0:02 0:04 0:05 0:02
Hours formal childcare 0:95 1:66 2:12 8:76
aThe combination credit (Combinatiekorting) is a ﬂat tax credit for working parents, with gross
income above 4857 euro, with a youngest child up to 12 years of age. We set the credit at 270 euro
per person
bThe additional combination credit (Aanvullende Combinatiekorting) is a ﬂat tax credit for working
secondary earners and working single parents, with gross income above 4857 euro, with a youngest
child up to 12 years of age. We set the credit at 600 euro per person
cThe income dependent combination credit (Inkomensafhankelijke Combinatiekorting) is a tax
credit for working secondary earners and working single parents with a youngest child up to 12
years of age. The tax credit is income dependent, we increase the phase-in rate from 4 to 8%. The
phase-in range runs from 4857 euro to 32,832 euro, at which the maximum credit increases by
1109 euro. The tax credit is not phased out
dAn increase in childcare subsidies (Kinderopvangtoeslag). Families only qualify for childcare
subsidies when both parents work. The change in childcare subsidies is set in such a way that there
is a proportional decline in the parental contribution rate. Because higher incomes have a higher
parental contribution rate, this beneﬁts more the parents with a higher income
eGini coefﬁcient of disposable household income, using equivalence scales. The Gini coefﬁcient
is calculated over the full Dutch adult population with gross income above 66% of the annual
minimum wage
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First, in column (1), we simulate the reintroduction of an in-work tax credit for
working parents with a youngest child up to 12 years of age (Combinatiekorting
in Dutch).20;21 This has a positive effect on labour supply. However, the effect on
labour supply is limited because a large part goes to primary earners in couples,
mostly men, who are rather unresponsive to ﬁnancial incentives.
Next, in column (2), we increase the in-work tax credit for secondary earners
and single parents with a youngest child up to 12 years of age (Aanvullende
Combinatiekorting in Dutch).22 Primary earners do not receive this tax-credit.
Therefore, the increase in labour supply is much larger, because it targets the
responsive groups of secondary earners and single parents (typically women)
with young children. These groups are rather responsive to changes in ﬁnancial
incentives.
The reform in column (3) is even more effective in terms of labour supply. In
this simulation we increase the income dependent part of the income dependent tax
credit for secondary earners and single parents with a youngest child up to 12 years
of age (Inkomensafhankelijke Combinatiekorting in Dutch).23 The number of hours
worked increases more than in column (2). The reform in column (3) not only makes
working more attractive, but also encourages secondary earners and single parents
to work more days per week.
Finally, we consider the effect of increasing childcare subsidies in column (4).
We consider a proportional decrease (of 38%) across incomes in the parental fee
that results after deducting the subsidy from the full hourly price. This reform not
only targets secondary earners and single parents with a youngest child up to 12
years of age, but also primary earners with children. Again, there is a substantial
increase in hours worked. However, the effects on labour supply in hours and
persons are smaller than in column (3). Indeed, the childcare reform reduces the
effective hourly child care price for parents. This leads to a large increase in the use
of formal childcare, see the last row in the table, which leads to substantial additional
budgetary costs (which are included in the 500 million euro of the impulse). This
makes this reform less effective per additional euro spent than the increase in the
income dependent tax credit for working parents with a young child.
20This tax credit was replaced by an income-dependent tax credit which we consider below.
21We reintroduce a tax credit of 270 euro for individuals earning at least 4,857 euro in the targeted
group.
22We reintroduce a tax credit of 600 euro for individuals earning at least 4,857 euro in the targeted
group.
23We increase the phase-in rate of 4 percentage points and increase the maximum credit by 1109
euro.
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Table 11.6 Reform package of the Tax Plan 2016
Simulation Tax Plan 2016a
Ex-ante impulse (in billion euro) 5:0
Percentage changes
Gini coefﬁcient 0:30
Hours worked per week 0:47
– Men in couples youngest child 0–17 0:01
– Women in couples youngest child 0–17 2:27
– Men in other couples 0:03
– Women in other couples 0:53
– Single parents youngest child 0–17 1:08
– Singles 0:45
Participation rate 0:56
– Men in couples youngest child 0–17 0:27
– Women in couples youngest child 0–17 1:59
– Men in other couples 0:12
– Women in other couples 0:68
– Single parents youngest child 0–17 1:17
– Singles 0:38
Effective labour units per hour 0:18
aSee the main text for a detailed description of all the elements of the Tax Plan 2016
11.6.5 Tax Plan 2016
Finally, Table 11.6 gives the simulation results of the Tax Plan 2016 of the Dutch
government, debated extensively in Dutch parliament. The Tax Plan 2016 reduces
income taxation by 5 billion euros. The main goal of this reform was to create more
employment (Ministry of Finance, 2015a,b). We ﬁrst discuss the elements of The
Tax Plan 2016, and subsequently discuss the simulation results.
The Tax Plan 2016 consists of the following elements:
• An increase in the in-work tax credit, targeted at low-income workers (+2.5
billion euros).24
• A reduction in the second and third tax bracket rate of 2.1 percentage points (+2.7
billion euros).
• An increase in the start of the fourth tax bracket by 8000 euros (+0.9 billion
euros).
24Here, the maximum level of the in-work tax credit is increased with 665 euros. The phase-out
now starts at an income of 33,000 euros instead of 49,895 euros.
jakob.de.haan@rug.nl
11 Tax-Beneﬁt Reforms and Structural Models for Labour Supply 261
• An increase in the income-dependent combination credit for working parents
with a youngest child of up to 12 years of age (+0.25 billion euros).25
• An increase in the childcare subsidy so that the parental contribution decreases
by 38% (+0.25 billion euros).
• The introduction of a wage cost subsidy for employers (+0.5 billion euros).26
• The general tax credit is phased out completely for higher incomes (–2.1 billion
euros).27 This increases the effective marginal tax rate for this group.
The simulation results in Table 11.6 show that this reform increases labour supply
in persons and hours worked, by 0.6% and 0.5%, respectively. The increase in
labour supply is relatively strong for single parents and women in couples with
young children. The Tax Plan 2016 includes a number of reforms that are relatively
effective in stimulating labour supply, such as the targeted in-work tax credit for
workers with a relatively low income, the income-dependent combination credit
and childcare subsidies. The reform however also reduces effective labour units per
hour and increases income inequality to some extent.
11.7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter we show how the behavioural responses to changes in ﬁnancial
incentives can be estimated and used in the analysis of tax-beneﬁt reforms, using
structural models of labour supply. A very large administrative dataset allows us to
uncover the behavioural responses for a large number of subgroups on the Dutch
labour market. We ﬁnd large differences in the responses to ﬁnancial incentives.
On the one hand, singles and men in couples are rather unresponsive to changes in
ﬁnancial incentives. On the other hand, single parents are women in couples with
young children are relatively responsive. We also ﬁnd that most of the response is in
the participation rate (the extensive margin), the response in hours worked per week
per employed (the intensive margin) is much smaller. We further ﬁnd cross effects
for women in couples that are non-negligible; when the income of the husband
increases, the women work less hours.
25The maximum amount of this credit increases by 500 euros, by increasing the phase-in rate from
4.0% to 5.8%.
26Employers receive a subsidy of 2000 euros (for a full-time position) for employees with an
hourly wage below 110% of the minimum wage. For employees with an hourly wage of between
110% and 120% of the minimum wage, the maximum subsidy is 1000 euros. For employees
working part-time, the wage cost subsidy is lowered proportionally. We do not explicitly model the
employer side. In the simulation we assume that the wage cost subsidy is fully shifted onto workers,
consistent with ﬁndings in e.g. Melguizo and Gonzalez-Paramo (2013). This seems particularly
likely in a small open economy such as that of the Netherlands, where capital is close to inﬁnitely
elastic to labour costs and labour is much less elastic to net wages.
27The phase-out rate increases from 3.32% to 4.80%.
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These ﬁndings have important implications for tax-beneﬁt reforms. Reductions
in tax bracket rates are relatively ineffective in stimulating labour supply, because
intensive margin responses are relatively small. Furthermore, for reductions in the
third and fourth tax bracket, the cross-effect on women’s labour supply in couples
also mitigates the effect on hours worked. Reductions in income support for low-
income households are relatively effective in stimulating labour supply, because
they target the more elastic extensive margin. However, the downside is an increase
in income inequality. On the other hand, increasing in-work beneﬁts for low-income
workers is also relatively effective, and can reduce rather than increase income
inequality. The most effective in terms of labour supply are tax credits and (child
care) subsidies for single parents and secondary earners with young children, as
these groups are the most responsive to changes in ﬁnancial incentives. We also
present simulation results for the Tax Plan 2016. The Tax Plan 2016 stimulates
labour supply in persons and in hours, and contains a number of policy changes that
are relatively effective, such as an increase in the in-work tax credit for low-income
workers, an increase in the in-work tax credit for single parents and secondary
earners with a young child and child care subsidies.
We conclude by indicating a number of limitations of the analysis. People are
assumed to be free in their choice of whether or not to participate, and how many
hours to work. In an extension we estimated a so-called double-hurdle model
(Cragg, 1971) for involuntary unemployment. The policy simulation results are
very similar to the base model (De Boer, 2015) as very few people in the data
are classiﬁed as involuntary unemployed.28 Furthermore, we focus on the labour
supply responses to changes in the tax-beneﬁt system, whereas other studies look
at a broader range of behavioural responses, by studying the elasticity of taxable
income (Saez et al., 2012b). Jongen and Stoel (2013) ﬁnd that the elasticity of
taxable labour income for the average worker is not that different from the labour
supply elasticity. But for high-income workers the labour supply elasticity is much
lower than the elasticity of taxable income, in line with other studies (Saez et al.,
2012b). Therefore, to determine the budgetary consequences of an increase in the
top tax rate, we need to consider other behavioural responses next to the labour
supply response. We further ignore general equilibrium effects on prices and wages,
but this may not be a bad approximation for the long run in a small open economy
like the Netherlands (Aaberge and Colombino, 2014). We also ignore the life cycle,
accounting for life-cycle effects can be important for the analysis of tax-beneﬁt
reform (e.g. Imai and Keane, 2004; Keane, 2011; Blundell et al., 2016). This would
be an interesting direction for future research, but requires data on consumption.
Finally, recent work by Chetty et al. (2009) shows that informational frictions can
play an important role in the behavioural responses to ﬁnancial incentives. This too
seems an interesting direction for future research.
28Note that we use data from before the Great Recession, when unemployment was relatively low
in the Netherlands.
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Chapter 12
CPB and the Assessment of Structural
Reforms
Laura van Geest and Daniel van Vuuren
12.1 Introduction
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis provides the ofﬁcial
economic forecasts on which budgetary policy is based. In addition, it produces
policy relevant economic research which is academically up to standard. In fulﬁlling
these tasks, CPB is unique in the world and has attracted attention of policy
makers in Europe, particularly for its contribution to evidence-based policy. One
of the unique features of CPB is its independent status. The idea of (more)
independent economic forecasts is embodied in the Independent Fiscal Institutes
(IFIs), which have been established in the Eurozone in the aftermath of the 2012
crisis, in line with EU regulation. The notion that independent assessments can
lead towards more competitive economies has led to the Council Recommendation
on the establishment of National Productivity Boards (2016), in line with the Five
Presidents’ Report (2015).
The Dutch experience may provide some inspiration for the establishment of
new institutes. We give an overview of CPB’s history and describe its mission and
daily practice. Speciﬁcally in view of the Recommendation on National Productivity
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Boards, we present some case studies in the area of labour market policies. Finally,
we confront our experiences with the legislation present and envisaged at the EU
level.
12.2 A Bird’s Eye View of CPB
This section presents a brief history of CPB and derives some important lessons.
In particular, some lessons can be drawn from CPB’s inception, its relation with
politics, its legal mandate, its position within society, and the kind of analyses it
provides.
12.2.1 Never Waste a Good Crisis
In the case of CPB, its inception ﬁts the stylized fact that crises can provide impetus
to novel approaches in policy. CPB started in 1945 (although it was formally
established only in 1947). The Netherlands and its economy had experienced major
destruction during World War II. Moreover, the war was proceeded by a deep
economic recession in the nineteen thirties. There was thus a clear need to get up to
speed with effective and efﬁcient policies to rebuild the Netherlands.
12.2.2 Water and Oil Don’t Mix
It also ﬁts the stylized fact that fragmented political systems favour neutral, third
parties or referees. Even after the war, Dutch politics remained ‘pillarized’ or
fragmented. Dutch election results inevitably led to coalition governments, as
no single party was ever able to muster a majority in parliament. Under those
circumstances, an independent institute is more attractive than an institute that might
just speak his master’s voice. Unbiased forecasts provided by institutions under a
political umbrella are highly unusual. In the Netherlands, independent forecasts and
analysis provide a common denominator for the political debate between parties.
The non-partisan role of the CPB led to a clear division of labour between analysis
and modelling on the one hand, and policy choices and judgment on the other hand.
CPB focuses on positive analysis, i.e., the state of the economy (forecasts) and
effective policy instruments for a broad range of topics. Rather than discussing
or advising on the desirability of certain policy goals, CPB concentrates on the
trade-offs between these goals. Policy advice is the purview of the Social Economic
Council, in which social partners as well as civil society, academia, the central bank
and CPB are represented.
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12.2.3 With a Little Help from My Friends
In terms of legal mandate and positioning, CPB started off as a typical Dutch
(informal) organization. The formal mandate of CPB was quite vague. The law
established CPB and required it to contribute to the Central Economic Plan (CEP).
Even though CPB still publishes a CEP every year, the document has little to do
with formal economic planning. It rather presents one of the four forecasts that
CPB publishes every year. While organizationally CPB is part of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, it operates independently. It was only in 2012 that this tradition
was formalized through secondary legislation, which explicitly states that CPB
cannot receive instructions from politicians or civil servants and determines its
own work program. In 2013, the government legally formalized the role of CPB as
independent forecaster for the budgetary process, in response to the requirements of
the Fiscal Compact and the Two Pack. However, in line with the existing view on the
proper division of labour between forecasting and policy analysis on the one hand,
and policy decisions on the other, the Dutch government allocated the normative
part of the mandate of an Independent Fiscal Institute to the Council of State. The
Council of State has a strong reputation in the area of independent policy advice,
while close cooperation on the basis of a clear division of labour between these two
bodies prevents double work and bureaucracy. In 2017, the CPB was designated as
the National Productivity Board.
CPB receives a budget from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, but this budget
can be supplemented from other ofﬁcial sources up to a maximumof 20%. Presently,
CPB employs around 115 full time equivalent staff. The Director is a civil servant,
appointed for a non-renewable 7-year period by the Council of Ministers. The
Director decides on the annual work program of CPB.
While the focus of CPB remained broadly unchanged, political developments,
new technologies, new economic insights and novel policy questions all left their
mark on the work of CPB over the decades.
12.2.4 Rome Was Not Built in a Day
Initially, CPB had some difﬁculty to ﬁnd its voice, as most political parties and
employers’ organizations had little sympathy for ‘the planning of the economy’
(Passenier 1994). As member of the Social and Economic Council, CPB gradually
found a way to contribute to the decentralized Dutch polder model of decision-
making. While the polder model seems to be on the wane, CPB kept its inﬂuential
position. The practice to analyse election platforms, since 1986, seems a case in
point.
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12.2.5 Panta Rhei
While CPB’s focus remained the same, policy issues and the associated analytical
approaches changed over time (Table 12.1). A loosely deﬁned mandate enabled
this type of adaptation. Practically, paper and pencil gave way to punched carts
and personal computers, allowing for more complex models. Theoretically, existing
Keynesian models were complemented with supply side models and short- and
medium-term forecasts with long-term projections, also in the form of scenario stud-
ies. The macro-economic focus was complemented by micro-economic research
on competition and regulatory issues. Cost beneﬁt analyses of individual projects
have been undertaken next to studies for the economy at large. Evaluations and
micro-econometric research have been added to the portfolio of activities as well.
Politically, topics changed over time as well, from rebuilding the Netherlands and
the establishment of the welfare state, to lessening labour shortages and later battling
high unemployment.
Table 12.1 Major events in the evolution of CPB
1945 Start of CPB with Tinbergen as its ﬁrst director
1946 Central government budget based on CPB’s estimates of the national economy. CPB
starts to provide a regular macroeconomic perspective on Dutch public ﬁnance. The
pre-war ideas of social planning gradually evolve into forecasts and analyses of
objectives and tools
1950 Start of Social and Economic Council
1953 First CPB-macro model for analysing and forecasting the Dutch economy
1961 In September each year, simultaneously with the Government Budget, a Macro
Economic Outlook on the Dutch economy is published, including estimates of Dutch
public ﬁnance
1971 First advisory group on ﬁscal policy; CPB is one of the participants
1976 Supply side included in macro-model (clay-clay vintage-production function), which
substantially changed policy recommendations
1986 First analysis of the economic consequences of the election platforms of political
parties
1992 First applied general equilibrium model for the labour market (MIMIC)
1992 First long-term scenario analysis stressing the role of institutions (Scanning the future)
1993 Start of ﬁrst major study on economic institutions: a comparison of economic
institutions in Germany and the Netherlands
1994 Cost-beneﬁt analysis of railway freight track to Germany (Betuwelijn)
1998 First analysis of sustainable public ﬁnance (generational accounts)
2000 National guidelines by CPB on cost-beneﬁt analysis
2012 Secondary legislation conﬁrming Independence CPB
2013 CPB (positive analysis) and Council of State (normative analysis) IFI for the
Netherlands
2017 CPB National Productivity Board for the Netherlands
Source: update of Bos and Teulings (2012)
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12.2.6 Bottom Up Is Best
CPB is a typical Dutch animal, established just after a major crisis, tailored to the
Dutch political arena. While the CPB experience can provide useful pointers, it is
naïve to think it can be effectively implemented in a completely different political
biosphere. Institutes like CPB can only play a role if the public at large is convinced
of evidence-based policy. Commitment is not achieved through force but through
persuasion, tailored to local circumstances.
12.3 CPB’s Mission: From Theory to Practice
CPB aims to provide independent, impartial economic analysis that is policy
relevant and academically up to standard. How did CPB become and, more
importantly, remain a widely trusted source of policy relevant economic analysis,
a dependable ‘Google translate’ between research and policy?
CPB’s ﬁrst director was Jan Tinbergen, front-runner in quantitative economics,
who received the Nobel prize in economics in 1969. He was well known and
respected, but also modest in outlook. A vocal advocate of a clear division of
labour between independent data collection (Statistics Netherlands), independent
policy analysis (CPB) and consensus building policy advice (SER), proponent of
the delineation between policy instruments and policy goals and well known for his
thesis that you cannot have more policy goals than independent instruments. CPB
still beneﬁts from its impressive ﬁrst front man, underscoring that newly established
institutes can beneﬁt from prudent early appointments.
CPB strives for neutrality and is perceived as independent and non-partisan. A
poll among the public at large shows that 91% of the respondents recognize CPB’s
name, with 60% knowing what CPB stands for; 58% of the respondents consider
CPB to be objective, while 12% regards CPB either left or right leaning (Ipsos
2015).
However, the drive towards neutrality is not straightforward and CPB is not
beyond public debate. Firstly, economics is just one of the social sciences and it has
taken a hit after the 2008 crisis. Economics as a discipline has a certain perspective
on policy issues. Psychologists, lawyers or philosophers might focus on different
issues, other instruments and look differently at concepts like trade-offs and the
welfare function. Furthermore, economists are more inclined to use ﬁgures than
scientists from other disciplines, as ﬁgures are believed to speak louder than words.
Where relevant, CPB enters collaborationwith other disciplines, but ﬁnding a proper
balance remains a challenge.
Secondly, the economics profession is a broad church. There are diverging views
and models, both normative and positive. While think tanks often tend to opt for
one school of thought or the other, CPB strives for a neutral stance. CPB focuses
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on empirical work and models and approaches, based on the research issue at hand.
This will satisfy most, but certainly not all.
Thirdly, CPB operates in a political and public environment. Maintaining a non-
partisan proﬁle requires a clear strategy on the type of work to be undertaken and
how to communicate about it. Even then it is not always successful, because parties
sometimes confuse the message and the messenger. Most importantly, CPB does not
give judgments. It sticks to the presentation of facts and analyses, showing trade-
offs between various policy goals, refraining from choices. It is our ﬁrm conviction
that facts speak louder than words. The allocation of the normative part of the IFI
mandate to a different body than CPB should be seen against this background.
CPB’s prudent approach means that some questions may remain unanswered
in order to avoid a descent into speculation. And when presenting results, the
uncertainties should be acknowledged, e.g. through fan charts in forecasts and
scenario analyses. As a non-partisan body, we provide bespoke analyses to all
parties in parliament (on occasion conﬁdentially), including opposition parties. In
general, requests are honoured provided adequate knowledge, time and personnel
are available. This also underscores our non-partisan proﬁle.
Becoming a trusted source of economic analysis requires high-quality work.
Academic standards are the norm and they are maintained through various means.
High-quality staff is a key factor and hiring is within the sole purview of the Direc-
tor, ensuring a meritocratic personnel policy. CPB staff does research themselves,
not only relying on available work done by others. This ensures maintenance of
adequate analytical skills and sound judgment in the use of academic research done
by others. Over time, CPB bolstered academic standards through a stronger focus on
publications in academic journals and more interaction with academia. Research is
now aimed at publication in a peer reviewed CPB series (CPB Discussion Papers),
in international peer reviewed journals, as well as presentation at international
seminars. CPB also expanded its network with Dutch economists through its
circle of Academic Partners (professors accredited at universities). Some CPB staff
members hold part-time positions at universities.
Policy relevance is safeguarded through frequent contacts with departments
and other relevant policy makers. This feeds in both to the choice of topics to
be analysed and proper institutional detail in the policy options discussed. Civil
servants and other policy makers are consulted on the Work Program,while CPB can
undertake research that is speciﬁcally funded by departments as well. Membership
of the Social and Economic Council and several advisory committees within the
government provides another channel of information and feedback. Research results
are discussed in seminars with civil servants present. Publication of CPB Policy
Briefs enhances the chance that research results will be used in policy-making.
These short, non-technical papers on policy issues are speciﬁcally tailored to policy
makers.
A ﬁnal backstop to ensure non-partisan quality work is public external reviews.
CPB’s independent position does not mean that it is not accountable. CPB has
a monitoring committee which commissions external reviews of both the policy
relevance and the academic quality of the output on a regular basis. In the 2016
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edition, the Review Committee employed the protocol that is the standard in Dutch
academia. It is also the ﬁrst review that does not focus on just one aspect of CPB
(policy relevance or academic standards), but that takes a look at the overall picture.
12.4 CPB Products and Their Role in Policy Making
Short and medium-term forecasting are the bread and butter of CPB. Four times
a year CPB produces short-term forecasts for the Dutch economy, varying from
growth, inﬂation and unemployment to the income distribution and public ﬁnances.
These forecasts feed into the debate about the annual budget, with the CEP,
published in March, serving as a starting point for the discussions on the expenditure
side, and the MEV, published in September, as the ﬁnalization of the negotiations. In
the run up to elections, CPB produces a medium-term forecast covering the full term
in ofﬁce of the new government. All these projections are made, using a standard
macro econometric model (Safﬁer-II).1 Research into academically popular models
like DSGE and BVAR did not yield a good alternative for this purpose, which
requires a combination of projections, policy simulations and storytelling. CPB
also produces the monthly World Trade Monitor, an empirical tool to follow actual
developments in world trade and global industrial production. The World Trade
Monitor is followed by forecasters across the world. At the speciﬁc request of
Parliament, CPB also produces an annual Financial Risk Report. In the aftermath
of the ﬁnancial crisis, a clear need was felt to follow ﬁnancial market developments
more closely.
CPB regularly publishes long-term studies. Every 4 years, CPB analyses the
sustainability of Dutch public ﬁnances (ageing studies). These projections are made
using an OverlappingGenerationsModel (GAMMA). The issue of sustainable ﬁscal
policy plays a major role in the Dutch political debate. Also other sustainability
issues have become important in political manifestos and the election debates.
Other long-term studies take the form of scenario analyses. On a regular basis,
CPB presents a study with scenarios for welfare, prosperity and the quality of
the living environment.2 This study provides the basic parameters for cost beneﬁt
analyses, which are mandatory for all large public investment projects. Other long-
term scenario studies have been undertaken on a more ad hoc basis.
CPB aims to improve the efﬁciency and effectiveness of Dutch policy-making
through evaluations. CPB undertakes ex ante cost beneﬁt analyses of major
investment projects (e.g. Business District Amsterdam, Afsluitdijk, Joint Strike
Fighter) and provides the (binding) rules guiding such analyses. Examples of ex
1And a series of satellite models, such as a micro simulation model for purchasing power, labour
costs, social security and income taxation (MIMOSI).
2In collaboration the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL).
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post evaluations of major policy reforms are the reorganization of social assistance
and various education policies.
Institutional detail is essential to bridge the gap between academic research and
the real world. CPB covers institutional issues in a number of areas, varying from
the pension sector and ﬁnancial institutions to health care. The results are widely
used—from the Social and Economic Council to the government and parliament.
Section 12.5 discusses some CPB studies in the ﬁeld of labour market policies,
illustrating how policy-related research may help improving growth prospects and
competitiveness.
Finally, CPB plays a supporting role in the election process and the formation
of a new government. CPB provides the medium-term economic scenario and the
sustainability analyses before political parties start to draw up their manifestos.3
Since 1986, CPB offers any party with representation in the lower chamber of
parliament the opportunity to have its program assessed. Parties are not required to
partake, but almost all have done so, in line with expectations of the media and other
political parties. Parties provide CPB with a ﬁnancial translation of their manifesto
(the measures are reported meticulously, so as to enable consistency checks with
the manifesto itself by the media and other parties). This set of measures is then
reviewed in various ways. First, an ex-ante budgetary test is applied, a kind of
reality check: are the proposed measures feasible? Is the costing realistic? Second,
a simulation is run, assuming that the party in question has the absolute majority in
parliament, using the models mentioned before and more. This provides insights
in the effects during the governing period of the next government on economic
indicators (such as growth, inﬂation, unemployment, income distribution, budget)
and on the long-term effects on labour supply and sustainable public ﬁnances. The
results are published in a book entitled Charted Choices a couple of weeks before the
election. This exercise sanitizes the debate, because it ensures a level of speciﬁcity
in the proposals and prevents blatantly false statements.
The assessment of election manifestos has broadened over time. Originally, three
parties took part, but in 2017 eleven party programs were assessed. The scope
of analysis increased over time and the level of detail rose. The frequency of
elections increased, making the available lead-time for the exercise more condense.
To cope with this pressure cooker challenge, a series Promising Policies has been
started, which is produced during non-election times.4 The series aims to provide
an overview of policy options over a wide political spectrum in a number of policy
areas, each with its pros and cons.
Once elections have taken place and a government is formed, CPB analyses the
coalition agreement in a comparable manner.
3In the run up to Budget Day, political parties (generally opposition parties) have the opportunity
to have their counter budget assessed by the CPB.
4The series is a co-production with the PBL and SCP (Netherlands Institute for Social Research).
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12.5 Case Studies
CPB contributes to the policy debate in different ways. This section illustrates
CPB’s role in four labour market reforms: the participation law aimed at creating
employment for low-productive workers, ﬁscal labour market policy in general, the
ﬁscal treatment of self-employment, and the state pension age. CPB is sometimes
agenda setting, presenting an economic problem with sensible ways to address it.
At other times its role is more passive, leaving the initiative to politicians and
policymakers, in which case CPB typically gives an indication about the effects of
different reforms. CPB may also act as a kind of referee. For instance, when different
parties negotiate about a new policy and the goal is to reach a certain budget cut,
CPB may assess whether the proposal will actually achieve this goal. Some practical
examples will be given in the following subsections, with an overview table in the
concluding subsection.
12.5.1 Participation Law
The ‘Participation Law’ is in effect since 1 January 2015. This law aims to improve
the position of low-productive workers, and at the same time cut government
expenses on social insurance. Before the enactment of the new law, expenses on
the disability scheme for starters on the labour market (Wajong) were rising at a
fast pace. A second reason for social insurance reform was that the Dutch public
employment scheme (Wsw) was among the most expensive in the world. At the
same time, the decentralization of social assistance to municipalities was considered
a success. Thus, the main ingredients of the new law were to decentralize a large part
of Wajong and Wsw to municipalities and simultaneously try to improve chances
for low-productive workers to get a normally paid job. In particular, labour of low-
skilled workers was made cheaper for employers by introducing wage subsidies.
Discussion about social insurance for low-productive workers started about
a decade before the introduction of the Participation Law. In 2007, CPB drew
attention to the rapidly rising number of ‘Wajong’-beneﬁt recipients.5 The number
of recipients then equalled about 150,000 (Fig. 12.1). By 2014, it had risen to
250,000, which is 2.5% of the total population between the ages of 20 and 65. In
2010, a commission reported on different options for reforming both the Wajong
and the public employment scheme Wsw.6 The Wsw (‘Social workplaces’) was not
5See Suijker (2007). By the end of 2006 the cabinet had already asked the Social and Economic
Council (SER) for an advice on the Wajong. But CPB’s publication on the matter gave the problem
broader attention.
6See Werkgroep brede heroverwegingen (2010). The goal of this commission was to ﬁnd ways
to cut budget expenditures after the start of the economic crisis in 2008. Apart from Wajong and
Wsw, many other policy options were studied in different reports.
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Fig. 12.1 Number of Wajong-beneﬁt recipients (1000). Source: UWV
considered successful, being one of the most expensive public employment schemes
in the western world, while virtually none of the participants could use their public
job as a stepping stone towards a normally-paid job.
In 2004, the then-state secretary of Social Affairs Mark Rutte decentralized
social assistance to municipalities. Municipalities became responsible for the
administration of social assistance and the re-integration into a normally paid job
of its recipients. The decentralization involved an important ﬁnancial incentive for
municipalities to contain their social assistance rolls. Municipalities receive a ﬁxed
budget to cover the social assistance costs. If they spend less municipalities may
keep the money but if they spend more they will have to cover the additional costs
from other sources. An early estimation by CPB concludes that the expenditures on
social assistance have been lowered by about 6% as a result of this decentralization
(Van Es 2010; Van Es and van Vuuren 2010).
In 2011, CPB published a discussion paper on the Wajong in combination with
social assistance (SA), which was followed by a Policy Brief (Roelofs and van
Vuuren 2011; Van Vuuren et al. 2011). In these publications, CPB argued that the
use of Wajong was for an important part a result of the decentralized SA budgets.
Municipalities had an incentive to redirect SA-recipients towards the centrally
ﬁnanced Wajong-scheme, which at that time was a close substitute for many SA
recipients. According to CPB estimates, nearly half of the Wajong enrolment in
2006 and 2007 was related to the decentralization of SA. The policy advice was
therefore to put (the substitutable part of) Wajong and SA in the same hand, namely
that of municipalities. This advice boosted the debate on Wajong and Wsw and
helped the government to reform the system.
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12.5.2 Fiscal Labour Market Policy
In CPB’s assessment of ﬁscal labour market policies, the focus is usually on
structural employment effects, budgetary effects, and the effects on purchasing
power.7 Overview publications with univariate policy changes are produced on a
regular basis. In this way, policy makers are continuously made aware of the effects
of ‘standard’ ﬁscal measures, such as lowering the tax rate in a speciﬁc tax bracket
or increasing the Earned Income Tax Credit (see CPB 2015b). In addition to these
regular publications, speciﬁc analyses are done at the request of political parties and
departments. For instance, plans for a ﬂat tax or a basic income reform have been
assessed by CPB (see Jongen et al. 2015).
The effects of ﬁscal labour market policies are usually assessed using the micro-
simulation model ‘MICSIM’ (see Jongen et al. 2014). This model is evidence-based,
i.e. largely based on empirical analyses of Dutch data. For instance, labour supply
elasticities for men and women were estimated (see also Chap. 11) and are now part
of the MICSIM model. A recent ﬁnding is that labour supply elasticities of women
are still substantially higher than for men—especially on the extensive margin, i.e.
the decision to either participate in the labour market or not (Fig. 12.2). But the
difference between men and women is substantially smaller than in earlier years (see
Evers et al. 2008). The MICSIM model provides an integrated model, i.e. the impact
of policy changes on main indicators (structural employment, income inequality,
and productivity) result from the same framework.
Table 12.2 shows some policy simulations with MICSIM.8 In terms of structural
employment, it turns out that lower health care allowances or child allowances
generate positive effects. These reductions lead to a lower implicit marginal tax
rate for lower-income households, encouraging these relatively elastic households
to increase their labour supply. The downside is, however, that poverty among
low-income households increases. A higher Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for
the lowest incomes is also beneﬁcial for structural employment, but in this case
the ‘price’ is paid by the government budget and not so much by lower income
households. Lowering income tax rates is—given the budgetary impulse—less
successful in terms of its impact on structural employment.
12.5.3 The Fiscal Treatment of Self-Employment
Self-employment in the Netherlands has been growing at a fast pace. Since 2003,
the number of self-employed workers has grown by more than 50%, towards about
1 million individuals, whereas the number of employed workers remained more or
7Also, effects on productivity are sometimes reported, see e.g. CPB (2015b).
8These examples are drawn from CPB (2015b).
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Fig. 12.2 Labour supply elasticities of men (left) and women (right) in couples
less constant (Fig. 12.3). This development has raised concerns about institutional
factors encouraging self-employment and discouraging wage employment. The
hypothesis that institutional factors have driven the growth in self-employment
seems to be conﬁrmed by a decomposition analysis, which ﬁnds that less than
half of this growth can be explained by socio-demographic and macro-economic
determinants (Van Es and vanVuuren 2011). Therefore,more than half of the growth
is likely related to institutions and/or social norms.
The precise effect of ﬁscal incentives on the growth of self-employment has not
been quantiﬁed yet, but a look at the difference in tax rates between self-employed
and employees shows that this might be an obvious explanation (Fig. 12.4). The
marginal tax rate is typically 15–25% points lower for self-employed than for
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Table 12.2 MICSIM-simulations: some examples
Budgetary effect
(billion euros)
Employment
(% change)
Productivity
(% change)
Gini-coefﬁcient
(% change) Remarks
Lower health
care allowance
(zorgtoeslag)
C1.5 C0.4 0.1 C1.4 Negative
disposable
income effects
for low-income
households
Lower child
allowance
(kindgebonden
budget)
C0.5 C0.3 0.0 C0.5 Negative
disposable
income effects
for low-income
households
with young
children
EITC for
lowest incomes
1.5 C0.2 0.1 0.3 Positive
disposable
income effects
for low-income
households
Lower income
taxes
1.5 [0.0, C0.1]a 0.0 [1.0, 0.3]a Positive
disposable
income
effectsa
aThe exact size of the effect depends on the tax bracket. Disposable income effects are positive for
low-income households if the tax rate in the lowest tax bracket is lowered, etc.
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Fig. 12.3 Self-employment grows; wage employment does not (2003 D 100)
employees, and the average tax rate is typically about 20% points lower. The tax
incentive is likely one of the explanatory factors for the growth of self-employment.
In 2012, CPB published a critical assessment about the ﬁscal stimulation of
self-employment (Van Vuuren 2012). Some possible arguments in favour of ﬁscal
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Fig. 12.4 Effective marginal tax rate (left) and average tax rate (right) for employees (dashed line)
are higher than for self-employed
stimulation were considered, such as employment growth and the stimulation of
innovation, but mostly rejected. Consequently, the government coalition agreement
‘Bruggen Slaan’ in 2012 included measures to lower the ﬁscal stimulation of self-
employment, in particular the so-called ‘Zelfstandigenaftrek’. However, due to a
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lack of political support, no policy measures in line with CPB’s assessment have
been taken so far.
In 2014, the cabinet installed a commission to study the phenomenon of self-
employment and develop policy options on how it could be dealt with. The report
was published in 2015, with policy options in line with CPB’s earlier assessments.9
The government has, however, decided not to take action yet, and leave further
policies to the next government (Asscher and Kamp 2015).
12.5.4 Raising State Pension Age
In 1997 and 2000, CPB drew attention to the effect of ageing on the sustainability of
government ﬁnances (CPB 1997; Van Ewijk et al. 2000). As a result of the ageing
population, government expenditureswould rise more than tax revenues. This would
result in a gap in the government budget. Expenditure reduction and/or increasing
tax revenues would be necessary in order to avoid this gap. A way to achieve this
was to stimulate labour force participation, in particular by reducing social security
expenditures. Raising the state pension age would obviously ﬁt into this policy, as it
would both reduce state pension expenditures and increase tax revenues as a result
of higher labour force participation.
In 2009, the government planned to increase the entitlement age for the state
pension ‘AOW’. Government expenditures on AOW were close to 5% of GDP at
that time, and according to CPB projections would rise to 6% in 2020 and 8%
in 2040. However, the trade unions did not accept the government plans and the
government gave them room to formulate an alternative policy within 6 months in
the context of the Social and Economic Council (SER). Apart from the unions, the
SER consists of representatives of employer organizations and experts (including
CPB) appointed by the government. The government imposed a restriction on the
alternative policy, namely that it should structurally improve the government budget
by 0.7% GDP. This ﬁgure was computed by CPB as the budgetary effect that would
result from increasing retirement age from 65 to 67 (CPB 2009a).
During these 6 months, many alternative policies were studied and CPB had to
assess the long-term budgetary impact of each one of them. For instance, increasing
the retirement age in combination with a ﬂexible pension age was studied, as
were separate arrangements for workers in ‘physically demanding jobs’ and older
unemployed workers. However, the SER negotiations failed, and by the end of 2009
the government announced that the retirement age would be stepwise raised by
2 years. CPB again provided quantitative input for these proposals (CPB 2009b,
2010).
9See IBO Zelfstandigen zonder personeel (2015). CPB (2015a) brought out a report for the
commission at its request.
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Fig. 12.5 The path for increasing the state pension age, starting in 2015. Notes: the increases
after 2021 are based on current estimations of future life expectancy developments. The steps may
turn out different in the future in case actual life expectancy developments deviate from these
expectations
The new government accelerated these steps in 2012, and on top the retirement
age was structurally tied to the ‘residual life expectancy’. This has resulted in
a stepwise path for the AOW age as shown in Fig. 12.5. The automatic link
between the retirement age and residual life expectancy has importantly improved
the sustainability gap and made long-term government ﬁnances more robust (Smid
et al. 2014).
12.5.5 Conclusion
CPB has played ﬁve different roles in the four cases discussed in this chapter. Table
12.3 summarizes these roles.
CPB has played—and continues to play in some cases—an agenda-setting role.
Examples are the Wajong, the ﬁscal treatment of self-employment, and the legal
retirement age. The issues were known before CPB published about it, but became
more important in the policy debate when CPB provided in-depth analyses and
ﬁgures. Attention for the state pension age was generated indirectly, by publishing
reports about the long-term sustainability of government ﬁnances. These reports
made clear that increasing the state pension age would be one of the most obvious
measures to counter the long-term budgetary deﬁcit due to aging. With Wajong and
the state pension age, actions in the form of new legislation have been taken already.
The ﬁscal treatment of self-employment has seen little action yet, but will likely be
addressed by the next government.With the analysis of ﬁscal labourmarket policies,
CPB’s role is more demand-driven. Outcomes of standard ﬁscal policies have been
published every once in a while.
CPB plays a more structural role in the analysis of ﬁscal labour market policies.
Some ﬁscal measures are ‘standard’, like adjusting tariffs in the income tax, and
their effects have regularly been published. In this case, CPB’s agenda-setting role
is smaller, although there can be an indirect effect. For instance, intensifying child-
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Table 12.3 CPB’s different roles in the four cases discussed
1. Participation
law
2. Fiscal
labour market
policies
3. Fiscal treatment of
self-employment
4. State pension
age
Agenda setting Yes Sometimes Yes Indirectly
Permanent
source of
information
Yes
Act as referee
during
negotiations
Yes
Assist
departments in
quantifying
effects
Yes Yes Not yet Yes
Assist
politicians in
quantifying
effects
Yes Yes
care subsidies became less popular after CPB’s assessment that they would have a
much smaller effect on the labour participation of women than previously thought
(Jongen 2010).
CPB has acted as a referee when the pension age reform was discussed among
social partners. The government had imposed the restriction that the reform should
improve the government budget in the long term by 0.7% of GDP. During the
negotiation process between the social partners, CPB assessed whether this goal
would be achieved. (And in most proposals, it wasn’t.)
Finally, CPB has assisted both ministries and political parties with quantifying
the effects of proposals. Before the approval of the Participation Law, several other
proposals have been assessed by CPB. In the context of reforming the tax system,
CPB has calculated the effects of different variants. It is quite common that CPB
either quantiﬁes the effects of policy proposals or checks the quantiﬁcations made
by the ministries themselves. Requests from politicians, e.g. members of parliament,
take place regularly. For instance, in the case of the participation law, CPB was asked
to inform the Dutch parliament about the effects (CPB 2012).
12.6 EU Policy Initiatives and the Dutch Experience: Some
Pointers
Some initiatives in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis seem to echo the Dutch
experience with CPB. Arguments favouring independent policy-making have been
widely accepted in the monetary policy arena, but its application in other areas
has traditionally been less straightforward. Choices in labour and product market
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regulation reﬂect political preferences, and ‘no taxation without representation’ is
considered a starting point of democracy. The move towards Independent Fiscal
Institutes, the decision to establish a European Fiscal Board and the recent Recom-
mendation to establish National Productivity Boards can be seen as experiments in
this direction.
The Fiscal Compact and Two Pack require countries to have an Independent
Fiscal Institute that (1) endorses or produces the macro-economic and budgetary
forecasts in the national budget, and (2) assesses whether the correction mechanism
for signiﬁcant deviations need to be activated or alternatively factors have occurred
which may allow for temporary deviations. As such, the Two Pack mixes positive
and normative elements; monitoring of indicators needs to be supplemented with
judgement of any discrepancies. In the Five Presidents’ report the creation of a
European Fiscal Board (EBF) was suggested and recently the European Commis-
sion decided to establish one (albeit with a somewhat different mandate). According
to the Commission’s decision, the EBF will (1) evaluate the implementation of the
EU ﬁscal framework (with room for suggestions for the future evolution of the
Union ﬁscal framework), (2) advise on the ﬁscal stance for the euro area as a whole
and (3) cooperate with national ﬁscal councils. Recently, the Council adopted a
recommendation to establish National Productivity Boards (NPBs) with as tasks (1)
diagnosis and monitoring of productivity and competitiveness developments and
its drivers, (2) independent analysis of policy challenges in this area and, where
relevant, assessment of policy options. The NPB should engage with other NPBs
with the aim of exchange views etc., as well as the Commission.
With the Dutch experience in mind, the following lessons come to the fore. First:
water and oil don’t not mix. A division of labour between those producing the facts
and analyses and those who decide on policy is a good thing. It enhances a level-
headed debate on policy goals and options. This is not to say that producing forecast
and analyses is straightforward and value-free per se, but the temptation to doctor
the ﬁgures is taken out of the equation.
Second: never waste a good crisis. CPB was established in 1945, just after WWII
and a deep ﬁnancial crisis in the 1930s. When things are difﬁcult, the desire for
evidence-based policy to solve issues effectively and efﬁciently may be strongest.
The introduction of IFIs during the Great Recession and the recommendation for
NPBs reﬂect this as well.
Third: with a little help from my friends. IFIs or NPBs do not need to start out on
their own, from scratch. Existing institutes can become responsible for these tasks.
There is nothing wrong with borrowing credibility from existing institutes, like a
National Audit Ofﬁce or a central bank.
Fourth: Rome was not built in a day. In 2015, CPB turned 70. It took time to
establish a reputation as a dependable source of economic forecasts and analyses.
The portfolio has been expanded gradually. The institute has started modestly and
built on its successes.
Fifth: facts speak louder than opinions. The ﬁscal framework unfortunately
requires IFIs to come up with judgments. The mix of positive and normative analysis
increases the risk of political appointees. It also makes it easier for politicians to
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ignore the facts, arguing that they are just personal opinions. An option here is to
divide the tasks over two institutes, like the Netherlands has done, or alternatively
present the facts and the opinions in separate documents. The IFI regulation cannot
be easily adapted. Fortunately, the normative bit was eliminated in the ﬁnal NPB
recommendation.
Sixth: bottom up is best. The strive towards evidence-based policy will work
best if institutions are perceived as locally owned, geared towards local issues and
problems, and able to provide bespoke solutions. This argues against tasks that
might be perceived as policing on behalf of the European Union, such as presently
incorporated in the IFI, but fortunately skipped in the NPBs mandate.
Seventh: panta rhei. Competitiveness is a multi-faceted and ever changing
concept. This argues against ﬁxating on a simple score board and favours a broad
mandate so that the study of the economy and relevant policies can change over
time. The case studies in this paper have underscored this point.
Finally: practice what you preach. At the EU level, economic forecasts that feed
into SGP procedures are not the product of an independent or autonomous body.
Moreover, the EU does not possess an independent body to analyse and evaluate
Commission policy or to commission economic research. The Commission’s
decision on the European Fiscal Board seems a missed opportunity.
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